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NOTES
FAILURE TO PROTECT: OUR CIVIL SYSTEM’S




This Note examines the effectiveness and enforceability of civil restraining
orders in domestic violence cases in the wake of Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzalez, which held that there is no constitutional right to the enforce-
ment of a restraining order.  This Note analyzes the impact of Gonzales
and the effectiveness of various restraining order statutory schemes more
broadly. This Note subsequently addresses that as a result of experiencing
continued contact from their attackers, victim mothers are more likely to
have their children removed by the state in child welfare proceedings, due to
the established presumption in most family courts that domestic violence
victims are unfit parents.  Ultimately, this Note advocates against a pre-
sumption of parental unfitness for domestic violence victims in child wel-
fare proceedings and in favor of a more mandatory enforcement scheme for
restraining orders in order to best protect the constitutional rights of victim
mothers and their children.
INTRODUCTION
In 1999 in Castle Rock, Colorado, sisters Rebecca, Kathryn, and
Leslie Gonzales, ages 10, 8, and 7 were playing in their yard when their
father, Simon Gonzales, kidnapped them from the custody of their
mother, Jessica.  Prior to the incident, Simon and Jessica had separated
and were going through a divorce.  Eventually, Simon started behaving
dangerously and erratically.  According to Jessica, at one time, she
found him in their garage, standing on a stool with his neck in a noose,
in front of their three daughters.  Jessica made repeated contact with
the police after the attempted suicide; she reported, “He would stalk us.
He would break into the house.  He didn’t have a key, when he wasn’t
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, 2017; Bachelor of Arts,
Washington and Lee University, 2014.  I would like to express my gratitude to Professor
Jennifer Mason McAward for her guidance on this Note, to the members of the Notre
Dame Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy for their editorial assistance, and to my family
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living there.”  In order to protect herself and her daughters, Jessica
obtained a restraining order against Simon.  The restraining order stip-
ulated that Simon could only be with his daughters on alternate week-
ends and during prearranged weeknight dinners.  One month after the
issuance of the restraining order, on a night on which Simon was not
scheduled to see his daughters, he took them from the yard of Jessica’s
home and drove away in his pickup truck.  Assuming it was Simon, Jes-
sica called the police and informed them of the situation.  She immedi-
ately showed the responding officers the restraining order against
Simon.  The police later told 60 Minutes, “What safer place can chil-
dren be than with one of the parents, the mother or the father . . . and
we had no indication from past records that he was ever violent . . . .”
Based on this lack of concern, the police drove around looking for
Simon, but subsequently did nothing.  When Jessica eventually con-
tacted Simon and found that he was outside Denver with the girls, she
asked the police to locate him, but they refused.  Ultimately, Jessica
called the Castle Rock police four times before she drove to the station
to tell the officers that her husband had violated a restraining order
and that her girls had been gone for seven hours.  According to the
police, Simon Gonzales drove to the Castle Rock police station at 3:20
A.M. and opened fire with a semi-automatic gun that he had purchased
that evening after picking up his daughters.  In the firefight, police shot
Simon to death.  When the police opened the cab of Simon’s pickup,
they found that Simon had shot Rebecca, Kathryn, and Leslie each
once in the head at point-blank range, after leaving an amusement park
where he had taken them.  He had driven around with their bodies
beside him for several hours.1  Jessica sued the Town of Castle Rock for
the police department’s failure to enforce the restraining order she had
obtained against Simon.  Jessica’s case made it to the Supreme Court
before a majority lead by Justice Scalia held that Jessica had no remedy
for the loss of her family; restraining orders, it seemed, were
discretionary.2
Jessica’s case is not unique, and unfortunately, victims like Jessica
enjoy no constitutional vindication for the harms they experience at the
hands of their abusers and in the face of law enforcement inaction.  In
the wake of Jessica’s case, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, it appears that
restraining orders are at the utmost discretion of the police, and their
enforcement is by no means mandatory.3  As a result, many domestic
violence victims run the risk of remaining vulnerable to and in contact
with their attackers, and no constitutional remedy exists to vindicate the
rights of victims harmed by attackers who were mandated by law to stay
away.
Unfortunately, the failure of our civil system to vindicate the rights
of battered women in the wake of unenforced restraining orders is but
1. Rebecca Leung, Gonzales v. Castle Rock: Supreme Court To Decide If Mother Can Sue
Her Town And Its Police, CBS NEWS, 60 MINUTES (March 17, 2005), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/gonzales-vs-castle-rock/.
2. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
3. Id.
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one of many inadequacies faced by these victims.  Perhaps the most
glaring flaw in our civil system exists in our nation’s tendency to punish
mothers who are victims of domestic violence for “failing to protect”
their children.  Increasingly, many states have enacted legislation that
allows family courts in state custody proceedings to remove custody
from battered mothers on the grounds that by remaining in contact
with their attackers or by existing in an abusive relationship, the
mothers are unfit on the grounds that they have “failed to protect” their
children from domestic violence.  As a result, many children are
removed from otherwise fit mothers and placed in foster care due to
societal fears of the dangers associated with a child’s exposure to
domestic violence.4
Certainly, there are cases in which domestic violence victims do not
wish to cut off all contact from their attacker, and certainly, society has
an interest in preventing a child’s exposure to domestic violence.  How-
ever, when combined, the practices described above create a system in
which battered mothers simply cannot win; ours is a system in which
our police forces can fail to protect a mother from the violence of her
attacker, as well as one in which a mother’s failure to protect her chil-
dren from the same attacker can lead to the termination of her paren-
tal rights.  Thus, this Note will examine the failure of existing civil rights
law to protect victims of domestic violence, both in terms of victim
safety and in maintaining the family unit.  Part I of this Note will ana-
lyze the effectiveness and enforceability of restraining orders in domes-
tic violence cases in the context of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales.  Part II
of this Note will then analyze our civil system’s failure to maintain the
family unit in domestic violence cases due to a prevailing presumption
that victims of domestic violence are unfit parents, despite the Supreme
Court ruling of Stanley v. Illinois, which held that courts must make an
individualized finding of parental fitness in order to comply with due
process.  Ultimately, this Note will argue that our civil system has cre-
ated a regime that renders meaningless, rather than vindicates, the civil
rights of domestic violence victims; Part III of this Note advocates for
statutory and institutional solutions to make restraining orders more
effective and to protect against the presumption of parental unfitness
for battered mothers.
I. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, RESTRAINING ORDERS, AND TOWN OF
CASTLE ROCK V. GONZALES
Before examining the impact of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales on
the effectiveness and enforceability of restraining orders, one must first
understand the danger of domestic violence in the United States.  The
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention define domestic violence as
intimate partner violence, which includes actual or threatened physical,
4. See, e.g., The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, Charging Battered Mothers with
“Failure to Protect”: Still Blaming the Victim, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 849 (1999); Margo Lin-
dauer, Damned if You Do, Damned if You Don’t: Why Multi-Court-Involved Battered Mothers Just
Can’t Win, 20 AM. U.J GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 797 (2012).
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sexual, psychological, or stalking violence by a current or former inti-
mate partner, whether of the same or opposite sex.5  The CDC defines
an intimate partnership as a close personal relationship that may be
characterized by the partners’ emotional connectedness, regular con-
tact, ongoing physical contact and sexual behavior, identity as a couple,
or familiarity or knowledge of each other’s lives; however, this list is not
dispositive.6  The CDC defines physical violence as the intentional use
of physical force with the potential for causing death, disability, injury
or harm, and includes, but is not limited to, scratching, pushing, shov-
ing, throwing, grabbing, biting, choking, shaking, hair-pulling, slap-
ping, punching, hitting, burning, the use of a weapon, and the use of
restraints or one’s body, size, or strength against another person.7  The
CDC’s definition of intimate partner violence also includes such behav-
iors as psychological aggression, manipulation, excessive monitoring,
exploitation of vulnerability, and gas lighting (the presenting of false
information to the victim with the intent of making them doubt their
own memory and perception).8
Domestic violence has become an extremely prevalent form of vio-
lent crime in the United States.  According to the CDC, 20 people per
minute will become victims of intimate partner violence.  DOJ findings
reveal similar results; between 2003 and 2012, domestic violence
accounted for 21% of all violent crime.  The DOJ found that over 74%
of domestic violence victims were female, and that current or former
boyfriends commit most domestic violence in the United States.  As of
the year 2000, approximately one in three females murdered in the
United States is killed by a partner, whereas approximately one in
twenty U.S. males murdered is killed by a partner.9
Over time, the United States experimented with various regimes to
address domestic violence.  Disturbingly, American common law pro-
vided battered women with no legal recourse until the late nineteenth
century.10  Between 1871 and 1883, three states enacted statutes
criminalizing spousal abuse.  In the early 20th century, family courts
began cropping up in order to combat domestic relations issues.  While
the initial statutes enacted by Alabama, Massachusetts, and Maryland
placed domestic violence in the criminal context, family courts aimed
to de-criminalize the issue by employing social workers who advised
5. MARTIE P. THOMPSON, ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CON-
TROL OF THE CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, MEASURING INTIMATE PART-
NER VIOLENCE VICTIMIZATION AND PERPETRATION: A COMPENDIUM OF ASSESSMENT TOOLS 1
(2006).
6. MATTHEW J. BREIDING, ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE SURVEILLANCE: UNIFORM DEFINITIONS AND RECOMMENDED
DATA ELEMENTS 11 (2015).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 12–15.
9. THOMPSON, supra note 5, at 1.
10. Amy Z. Zelcer, Battling Domestic Violence: Replacing Mandatory Arrest Laws with a
Trifecta of Preferential Arrest, Officer Education, and Batterer Treatment Programs, 51 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 541, 543 (2014).
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married couples to solve abuse issues through counseling.11  Not until
the 1970s, with a wave of “grassroots feminism,” did domestic violence
shelters begin to act as safe-havens for battered women; the 1970s also
saw the creation of the Office of Domestic Violence within the U.S.
Department of Justice, fierce advocacy for police intervention in domes-
tic violence, and the legislation of civil protective remedies in many
states.12  Despite this progress, public opinion and the opinion of law
enforcement reflected the notion that men did not need to be arrested
or jailed for what was likely a “respon[se] to marital stress.”13
In 1984, a case called Thurman v. City of Torrington brought to light
the grossly inadequate societal and legal responses to domestic violence
and sparked the enactment by many states of mandatory arrest laws.14
In Thurman, the plaintiff, Tracey Thurman, a mother, sued the defen-
dant, the City of Torrington, Connecticut, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983,
1985, 1986, and 1988, as well as the Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution.  Tracey alleged that the defendant
violated her constitutional rights by the nonperformance or
malperformance of City police officers.15  In that case, over the course
of a year, Tracey endured numerous threats against her life and her
child by her estranged husband Charles, which the Torrington Police
department largely overlooked.16  Ultimately, Charles brutally attacked
Tracey with a knife until police began to arrive; unperturbed and unin-
hibited by the officers, Charles continued to beat Tracey in the pres-
ence of the officers until he was eventually taken into custody.17  The
District Court in Thurman held that the conduct of the police officers
implicated the Equal Protection Clause and §1983.18  The court in that
case held that if officials have notice of the possibility of domestic
attacks, they are under “an affirmative duty to take reasonable measures
to protect the personal safety of such persons,” and “failure to perform
this duty would constitute a denial of equal protection.”19  As a result of
this duty to protect victims of domestic violence, the Thurman court
held that if the City of Torrington wished to discriminate against
domestic violence victims, it must articulate an important governmental
interest for doing so.  The court in that case subsequently emphasized
the “outdated misconception” of the notion of a husband’s prerogative
to physically discipline his wife and ultimately held that the City of Tor-
11. Id. at 543.
12. Id. at 543–44.
13. Id. at 544 (“One study conducted in the early 1970s showed that out of twenty-
three cases in which men were arrested for severely beating their wives, only nine of the
defendants went to jail.  The author of the study attributed the lenient sentencing to the
court’s belief that the men were merely ‘responding to marital stress’ or to their wives’
incendiary conduct.  Women were ‘agents provocateurs’ in their own thrashings.”) (foot-
notes omitted).
14. Id. at 545.
15. Thurman v. City of Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984).
16. Id. at 1524–45.
17. Id. at 1526.
18. Id. at 1528.
19. Id. at 1527.
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rington’s motion to dismiss Tracey Thurman’s complaint would be
denied.20  In response to Thurman, the United States experienced a
shift in the police response to domestic violence, stemming in part
from Thurman and in part from the publication of an empirical study
on the effects of mandatory arrest in domestic violence situations.21
However, while the overall response of America’s civil and criminal sys-
tems to domestic violence increased in intensity over time, as I will dis-
cuss below, our civil system fails to vindicate the rights of victims when
such victims are harmed in the absence of an arrest for the violation of a
restraining order.
Restraining orders are an integral part of our justice system’s effort
to protect domestic violence victims.  Every year, millions of battered
women seek restraining orders, also called protection orders, as a way
to prevent further abuse by their attackers.22  Since Pennsylvania
became the first state to make civil protection orders available to
domestic violence victims over 40 years ago, today, all 50 states have
enacted statutes providing for their ability; according to the Council of
Juvenile and Family Court Judges, civil protection orders are the pre-
dominant legal remedy that victims seek to end the violence against
them.23  When a victim seeks a civil restraining order, a court can grant
an injunction to the respondent (in domestic violence contexts, the
abuser) prohibiting them from contacting, harming, harassing, or stalk-
ing the victim.  Civil restraining orders can also be tailored to situations
in which the parties have children together, in that orders may assign
physical and legal custody of the children to the victim while setting
conditions for supervised visitation or exchange.  Therefore, civil
restraining orders allow domestic violence victims to bypass the rigidity
of the criminal justice system, giving them more control over the out-
come with a view to their specific needs.24
In addition to providing domestic violence victims more flexibility,
civil restraining orders provide other advantages to the individuals who
seek them.  For instance, such orders are an especially important tool in
protecting victim safety because the risk of experiencing violence
increases significantly both during and after separation; this risk stems
from a perpetrator’s perceived loss of control over the victim.  As a
result, victims who separate from their abusers not only run a greater
risk of experiencing child abduction, acts of violence, threats, and stalk-
ing, but of actually being murdered by their intimate partner abuser.25
Because of the heightened importance of restraining orders as a safety
tool, the role of law enforcement in protecting domestic violence vic-
20. Id. at 1527–28.
21. Zelcer, supra note 10, at 545.
22. EMILIE MEYER, NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, FAMILY
VIOLENCE DEP’T, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: A GUIDE FOR IMPROVING PRACTICE 1 (2010).
23. Id. at 2.
24. Id. at 2–3.
25. Id. at 2 (citing PATRICIA & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXTENT,
NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 42 (2000)).
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tims from further abuse becomes exceedingly important.  A section of
the Civil Protecting Orders Improvement Guide, a work presented by
the National Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges, Family Vio-
lence Department, was authored by and written for law enforcement
officers working to protect victims of abuse.26  According to this guide,
law enforcement officers have several roles in the effective enforcement
of civil protection orders; these roles include serving the protection
order and notifying the victim, promoting safety through weapons
seizure, and enforcing violations of protection orders.27  These roles
are designed to keep battered women safe in the wake of obtaining a
protective order against their abuser; while many victims of intimate
partner violence do experience increased safety as a result of obtaining
a civil restraining order,28 barriers in both service and enforcement of
restraining orders frustrate the fulfillment of law enforcement roles.
Despite the importance of law enforcement roles in the effective
promulgation and enforcement of restraining orders, law enforce-
ment’s fulfillment of such roles has been far from exemplary.  First,
many domestic violence victims perceive a significant failure of law
enforcement to take the danger they are in seriously and to realize the
consequences of a failure to enforce protective orders.  For instance, a
Gender Bias task force created in Texas to analyze the adequacy of the
Texas judicial system’s response to domestic violence conducted a sur-
vey to examine the adequacy of police enforcement against domestic
violence and the effectiveness of protective orders.  One-half of women
polled by the task force in its judicial survey indicated a belief that law
enforcement officers frequently do not take domestic violence seriously
enough.29  Second, scholarship and statistics agree that these percep-
tions are grounded in fact; police views with respect to the severity and
importance of domestic violence differ in relation to their perceptions
of other violent crime.30  Only 36% of the 2.1 million domestic violence
incidents reported to the police between 1998 and 2002 resulted in an
arrest of the abuser.31  Convictions for family assault are less harsh than
those for felony assault as among state court felony convictions; 45% of
family assault offenders received a sentence of more than two years,
compared with 77% of felony assault offenders.32  In addition to milder
punishments and lower likelihoods of arrest for perpetrators, victims
who seek restraining orders against their abusers often see these orders
26. MEYER, supra note 22, at 1.
27. Id. at 1–3.
28. Id. at 3 (“Studies reveal that between 30 percent and 77 percent of victims
report that the process and act of receiving the order ends the violence.”).
29. James Martin Truss, The Subjection of Women . . . Still: Unfulfilled Promises of Protec-
tion for Women Victims of Domestic Violence, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 1149 (1995).
30. See, e.g., Sarah Metusalem, Should There Be a Public Duty to Respond to Private Vio-
lence? The Effect of Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales on Restraining Orders, 38 U. TOL. L. REV.
1037, 1054 (2007); Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 46–47 (1992).
31. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PUB. NO. NCJ 207846, FAMILY
VIOLENCE STATISTICS, INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 2 (2005).
32. Id. at 2.
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go unenforced.33  An estimated 60% of restraining orders are violated
within a year of their issuance; 29% of such violations are violent.34
Scholars offer several proposed explanations for under-enforcement.
One theory posits that law enforcement officers harbor latent biases
against women,35 while other scholars assert that police departments
consider domestic violence calls unglamorous, non-prestigious, and
unrewarding; such assertions point to police categorization of domestic
violence cases as inherently dangerous police work.36  Other scholars
suggest that deference to family privacy has been used to explain inac-
tion, as has the (ludicrous) perception that domestic violence is a “vic-
timless crime”; another offered explanation for officer inaction is the
belief that legal involvement is ineffective, and thus, futile.37  Whatever
the reason for police inaction with respect to domestic violence and the
enforcement of restraining orders, the continued prevalence of domes-
tic violence demonstrates our system’s flaws.
Despite the prevalence and severity of domestic violence in our
country, and despite the prevailing importance of civil protection
orders or restraining orders to the victims who seek their protection,
the evidence demonstrates that such victims fail to see such orders
enforced and continue to experience violence at the hands of their
abuser.  In 2005, the Supreme Court majority in Castle Rock v. Gonzales
vindicated traditions of police inaction in response to domestic violence
and in the face of restraining orders and effectively hamstringed the
most meaningful civil remedy for domestic violence victims harmed by
police in action.
Following her husband Simon’s murder of their three children,
Jessica Gonzales filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the
town of Castle Rock violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the grounds that Castle Rock’s police officers, acting
pursuant to official policy or custom, failed to respond to her repeated
reports to the police that her husband had taken the girls in violation of
her restraining order against him.38  The Supreme Court considered
whether an individual who has obtained a state issued restraining order
has a constitutionally protected property interest in having the police
enforce the restraining order when they have probable cause to believe
it has been violated.39  The majority, led by Justice Scalia, first evaluated
the language of the Gonzales restraining order, which commanded
Simon Gonzales not to molest or disturb the peace of Jessica or any of
their children and to remain at least one hundred yards from the family
33. Michael Mattis, Protection Orders: A Procedural Pacifier or a Vigorously Enforced Pro-
tection Tool? A Discussion of the Tenth Circuit’s Decision in Gonzales v. Castle Rock, 82 DENV.
U. L. REV. 519, 520 (2005).
34. Stephanie Smiertka, The Federal Fortress Surrounding Police Liability for Failure to
Enforce Protection Orders, 21 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 87, 87–88 (2012).
35. Mattis, supra note 33, at 520.
36. Zorza, supra note 30, at 47–52.
37. See Kathleen Waits, The Criminal Justice System’s Response to Battering: Understand-
ing the Problem, Forging the Solutions, 60 WASH. L. REV. 267, 299 (1985).
38. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 748 (2005).
39. See id. at 750–51.
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home at all times.40  The Court evaluated two “Notices” on the
restraining order, one directed at the restrained party and one directed
at law enforcement.  The order stated that the restrained party “may be
arrested without notice if a law enforcement officer has probable cause
to believe” that the restrained party knowingly violated the order.  The
notice to law enforcement stated,
YOU SHALL USE EVERY REASONABLE MEANS TO ENFORCE
THIS RESTRAINING ORDER. YOU SHALL ARREST, OR, IF AN
ARREST WOULD BE IMPRACTICAL UNDER THE CIRCUM-
STANCES, SEEK A WARRANT FOR THE ARREST OF THE
RESTRAINED PERSON WHEN YOU HAVE INFORMATION
AMOUNTING TO PROBABLE CAUSE THAT THE
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS VIOLATED OR ATTEMPTED TO
VIOLATE ANY PROVISION OF THIS ORDER AND THE
RESTRAINED PERSON HAS BEEN PROPERLY SERVED WITH
A COPY OF THIS ORDER OR HAS RECEIVED ACTUAL
NOTICE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS ORDER.41
In light of the language of the order, the Castle Rock majority con-
sidered the scope of procedural due process rights.  The Fourteenth
Amendment mandates that no state shall deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law, and through § 1983,
Congress created a federal cause of action for the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.42
A prior case, DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., held that
substantive due process does not require the state to protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors, but
left open the question of whether state child protection statutes gave
the child victim an “entitlement” to due process protection to receive
protective services from the state.43  While that case dealt with the duty
of police officers to protect a child from danger, the question of “enti-
tlement” presents itself both in DeShaney and Castle Rock.  While the
majority acknowledged the question left open by DeShaney it moved on
to consider what constitutes a benefit for the purpose of determining
whether an individual has an interest protected by due process.44
According to Justice Scalia, a benefit is conferred on an individual hav-
ing more than an abstract need, desire, or unilateral expectation;
instead, the individual must have a legitimate claim of entitlement stem-
ming from an independent source, such as state law, and the entitle-
ment must not be granted or denied at the discretion of government
officials.45
40. See id.
41. Id. at 751–52 (citing Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 366 F.3d 1093, 1143–44
(10th Cir. 2004)).
42. Id. at 755 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000)).
43. See id. at 754–55 (citing DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489
U.S. 189 (1989)).
44. See id.
45. See id. at 756.
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In light of this interpretation of the law, Justice Scalia concluded
that despite its language, the Colorado restraining order statute did not
make the enforcement of such orders mandatory.46  The Justice argued
that U.S. common law supports a historic tradition of discretion in law
enforcement matters, citing Chicago v. Morales as an example.47  Justice
Scalia also pointed out that all police officers must use some discretion
in deciding when and where to enforce city ordinances.48  Justice Scalia
also found that the language of Colorado’s restraining order statute,
stating that “every reasonable means” shall be employed to enforce a
restraining order, was not strong enough to be considered mandatory
and that the statute itself was too broad and vague to confer a legitimate
entitlement, given that it allows police officers to choose between seek-
ing a warrant for the attacker’s arrest and arresting the attacker imme-
diately.49  Finally, Justice Scalia wrote that even if the Supreme Court
were to accept that Colorado’s restraining order statute carried
mandatory enforcement, Jessica Gonzales enjoys no constitutional rem-
edy for its failure to be enforced under a procedural due process claim
under § 1983 because she has no legitimate property interest in its
enforcement.50  The majority opinion stated that the seeking of an
arrest warrant is an entitlement to procedure only and that the right to
enforcement of a restraining order carries no “ascertainable money
value.”51  Ultimately, Justice Scalia concluded that Jessica Gonzales did
not have a due process property interest in police enforcement of the
restraining order against her husband; therefore, the Castle Rock major-
ity did not reach the question of whether the police’s failure to enforce
the restraining order deprived Jessica Gonzales of that interest without
due process.52
While Castle Rock remains good law, many legal scholars critique
this decision on a number of grounds.53  First, commentators attack the
majority’s position on the basis that the majority misunderstands the
requisite for property interests resulting in a benefit or entitlement.
46. See id. at 760.
47. See id. at 761. Chicago v. Morales invalidated a local ordinance requiring police,
on observing a person they reasonably believed to be a street gang member loitering in
any public place with one or more persons, to order all such persons to disperse, and
made failure to obey such an order a violation.  The Supreme Court invalidated the stat-
ute on the grounds of unconstitutional vagueness, in that it failed to provide fair notice of
prohibited conduct and establish minimal guidelines for enforcement. See City of Chicago
v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
48. See Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 761.
49. See id. at 763 (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3)(b) (2005)).
50. See id. at 768.
51. Id. at 766–67.
52. Id. at 763–69.
53. See, e.g., Allison J. Cambria, Note, Defying a Dead End: The Ramifications of Town
of Castle Rock v. Gonzales on Domestic Violence Law and How the States Can Ensure Police
Enforcement of Mandatory Arrest Statutes, 59 RUTGERS L. REV. 155 (2007); Metusalem, supra
note 30; G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Con-
ceptions of State Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111 (2006); Sara B. Poster, An Unreasonable
Constitutional Restraint: Why the Supreme Court’s Ruling in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales
Rests on Untenable Rationales, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 129 (2008); Smiertka, supra
note 34.
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One of the cases relied on by the Court to bolster its argument in favor
of police discretion, as opposed to an entitlement, actually invalidated a
statute affording too much discretion to police.54  In Chicago v. Morales,
the Court invalidated an ordinance allowing Chicago police officers to
arrest persons who failed to disperse after an officer perceived a person
he reasonably believed to be a street gang member loitering in a public
place with such persons; the Court held this ordinance unconstitution-
ally vague and invalidated it in light of the “absolute discretion”
afforded to police on the statute’s face.55  In addition, other critics of
the Court’s understanding of a property interest attack Justice Scalia’s
assertion that such interests must have an ascertainable money value,
arguing that this standard is overly broad, conceptually vague, and illog-
ical.  Clearly, some possessions are too valuable to be given a price at all
or have values that simply cannot be assigned to a dollar amount; a
restraining order has great value to the victim it is designed to protect,
yet such protection is not a tangible item that can be bought or sold.56
In addition, ascertainable money value is not a pre-requisite for a prop-
erty interest under the due process clause.57  For example, in Board of
Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, the Supreme Court held that an
employee’s interest in his or her continued public employment was a
property interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause; in that
case, the Court acknowledged that property interests protectable under
due process encompass more than real estate, chattels, or money.58
Other such interests that the Court has held to constitute property
interests include public employment, drivers’ licenses, parole proceed-
ings, probation, public education, and certain statutorily-defined causes
of action; importantly, none of the aforementioned, Court-endorsed
property benefits carry an ascertainable money value.59  Thus, the
majority’s decision in Castle Rock rests on untenable arguments and
rationales.  Whatever the perceived shortfalls of the majority’s position,
however, it appears that the impact of the decision will only vindicate
and reaffirm previous police tendencies towards inaction and under-
enforcement of restraining orders.
According to a guide for the improvement of civil protection
orders, “[d]ependable enforcement is central to victim safety and per-
petrator accountability and helps ensure that the protection order is
not a hollow document, but rather a commitment on behalf of the sys-
tem to support and protect.”60  Scholarship is somewhat divided on the
54. See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999).
55. Id. at 60; see also id. at 71 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“The ordinance is unconstitu-
tional, not because a policemen applied this discretion wisely or poorly in a particular
case, but rather because the policemen enjoys too much discretion in every case.”).
56. See Poster, supra note 53, at 137–39.
57. See id. at 139–40.
58. See id. at 140–41 (citing Bd. of Regents of State Coll. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)).
59. See id. at 141–43.
60. MEYER, supra note 22, at 16.
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effects of Castle Rock on lower court decisions.61  Some commentators
suggest that the application by lower courts of Justice Scalia’s decision is
largely confused or inconsistent as applied to procedural due process
claims, while it has a more profound effect on law enforcement agen-
cies specifically.62  Several lower court decisions have rejected procedu-
ral due process claims, justifying the denials on Castle Rock grounds,
while one court allowed the claim only for its decision to be reversed on
appeal.63
One criticism not of the Court’s reasoning, but of its result argues
that the Court’s decision severely limits the available civil remedies for
victims of domestic violence who are harmed by under-enforcement of
restraining orders.  In Castle Rock’s wake, the only viable federal consti-
tutional claim for victims is one under the Equal Protection Clause;
however, Equal Protection claims carry “nearly insurmountable plead-
ing standards,” making such challenges largely unsuccessful.64  In addi-
tion, the state-created-danger doctrine has proved ineffective as a
remedy also because of its burden of proof.  That doctrine requires that
the plaintiff demonstrate that the police increased danger to the victim
by failing to enforce a restraining order, and in light of recent prece-
dent, many trial courts refuse to uphold such claims because of a per-
ceived failure of plaintiffs to demonstrate that a failure to enforce
equates to an “affirmative action” that increases danger.65  As a result,
the Castle Rock decision leaves victims harmed by law enforcement inac-
tion with little or no available civil remedies for their harm.
Commentators have also analyzed prospective law enforcement
reactions to the Castle Rock decision.  Some scholarship argues that
since law enforcement agencies no longer face the specter of successful
procedural due process claims, they will have little incentive to imple-
ment any changes in their procedure in terms of the way departments
handle incidents of domestic violence and the enforcement of
restraining orders.66  Furthermore, if examining the behavior and
rationale of the Castle Rock police department offers any evidence, that
police department felt that they acted entirely appropriately, even given
the devastating facts of that case.67  As mentioned above in this Note,
police attitudes regarding the importance of restraining order enforce-
ment prior to Castle Rock reflected a tendency to view order violations as
less important or of less seriousness than other offenses; scholarship
suggests that the Castle Rock decision, in failing to hold non-enforcers
accountable for their actions, only vindicated such indifference.  A
61. See, e.g., Cambria, supra note 53; Metusalem, supra note 30; Poster, supra note
53.
62. See Metusalem, supra note 30, at 1046.
63. See id. at 1046–1051 (citing Starr v. Price, 385 F. Supp. 2d 502 (M.D. Pa. 2005);
Majors v. City of Oakland, No. 05-00061 CRB, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15726, (N.D. Cal.
July 21, 2005); Howard v. Bayes, 457 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2006)).
64. See Smiertka, supra note 34, at 89–90.
65. Id.
66. See Metusalem, supra note 30, at 1054.
67. See id. at 1054 (citing Pam Lambert et al., Could Cops Have Saved Her Kids?, PEO-
PLE, Apr. 11, 2005, at 91).
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chief concern arising from such vindication is that it not only indirectly
harms domestic violence victims through a limiting of civil remedies,
but also harms them directly though weakening restraining orders as a
tool for protection.68
Finally, the failure to provide a civil remedy for domestic violence
victims in the wake of an arguably inactive criminal justice system and
an arguably ineffective civil restraining order system brings into sharp
relief several very tangible, severe, and quantifiable harms.  For exam-
ple, the Department of Health and Human Services conducted a study
revealing that the costs of intimate partner rape, physical assault, and
stalking exceed $5.8 billion each year, with the majority of that cost
allocated for direct medical and mental health care services.69  Nearly
$1 billion of such costs stem from lost productivity from paid work and
household chores for victims of nonfatal intimate partner violence, and
nearly another $1 billion stems from lifetime earnings lost by victims of
intimate partner violence homicide.70  Despite the startling severity of
these statistics, the Department of Health and Human Services esti-
mates that due to exclusions of several cost components about which
data were unavailable or insufficient, including certain medical services,
social services, and criminal justice services, the costs presented by their
report likely underestimate the problem of intimate partner violence in
the United States.71  These statistics demonstrate not only the horrible
prevalence of domestic violence, but also the devastating economic
harm this epidemic does not only to the individual victim, but also to
society.  Because the mechanisms our criminal system currently has in
place do not adequately prevent or address domestic violence, our civil
system needs to provide remedies to further deter wrongdoing by
encouraging active participation from our criminal justice system.  By
effectively eradicating feasible civil remedies, the Castle Rock decision
has the potential to leave wholly unaffected the astounding economic
and societal harm sustained by the United States and the staggering
ranks of victims abused each year.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND STATE INITIATED
CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS
Due to the lack of effectiveness of most restraining orders, espe-
cially in light of their discretionary nature following Town of Castle Rock
v. Gonzales, our current system fails to adequately protect victims of
domestic violence and their families from perpetrators of domestic vio-
lence.  As if the devastating damage caused by forceless restraining
orders did not place mothers and families at enough risk, another
68. Id. at 1054 (explaining that some police departments have responded positively
to the Castle Rock decision by increasing training regimens and implementing policies
favoring arrest in light of some recognition of a problem regarding the perception of the
seriousness of restraining orders).
69. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (2003).
70. Id.
71. Id.
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aspect of the way in which our country handles domestic violence
presents an even greater threat to the sanctity of the family unit.
Increasingly, either through state common law or through explicit legis-
lation, many states are using the existence of domestic violence in the
family home as a justification for removing custody of the children from
a battered mother and placing custody in the hands of the state social
services body.  However, such systemic removal of children from other-
wise fit parents is a direct contradiction of the Supreme Court’s holding
in Stanley v. Illinois, which stands for the proposition that a family court
must make individualized findings of parental fitness before deciding to
remove custody of a child from either parent.72
In Stanley v. Illinois, the Supreme Court considered the propriety of
removing child custody from an unmarried father, absent independent
findings of parental unfitness.73  In that case, Peter Stanley’s children
were removed from him by the State and placed with court-appointed
guardians after their mother passed away on the grounds that he was an
illegitimate father.74  On appeal, Peter claimed that he personally had
never been shown to be an unfit parent; as a result, Peter claimed that
he had been deprived of the equal protection of the law guaranteed to
him by the 14th amendment.  Opposite Peter, the State argued that
unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children, so it is unnec-
essary to hold individualized hearings to determine whether particular
fathers are in fact unfit parents before they are separated from their
children.75  The Court thus considered whether the method of proce-
dure by presumption of unfitness could be allowed to stand in light of
the fact that Illinois allowed married fathers, whether divorced, wid-
owed, or separated, and mothers, even if unwed, the benefit of the pre-
sumption of fitness rather than unfitness.76  The Stanley court held that
the Due Process Clause renders the State’s offered justification for
refusing a father a fitness hearing insufficient when the issue at stake is
the dismemberment of his family.77  Thus, the Court concluded that
parents are constitutionally entitled to a fitness hearing before their
children are removed from their custody, and the denial of such a hear-
ing is contrary to the Equal Protection Clause.78
Despite Stanley’s seemingly clear holding, several states have
enacted legislation that effectively allows the State to remove custody
from victim mothers.  Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and
Wyoming have all enacted legislation that includes domestic violence as
72. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 646.
75. Id. at 647.
76. Id. at 646–57.
77. Id. at 658.
78. Id.
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a factor to be considered in custody and visitation determinations.79
Alaska, Connecticut, Delaware, Minnesota, Montana, Utah, Washing-
ton, and West Virginia have enacted explicit legislation stating that chil-
dren’s exposure to domestic violence constitutes child abuse and or
neglect.80  In 1996, New York enacted a law mandating its courts to
consider proven allegations of domestic violence in deciding child cus-
tody and visitation cases in light of the “best interests of the child” as
well as “other factors . . . as the court deems relevant.”81  Prior to 1996,
New York law mandated only that courts consider domestic violence
when a child had directly witnessed the incident.82  The statutory basis
for such laws stems from the Family Court Act, or the FCA.83  The FCA
breaks down the definition of a “neglected child” into two sections with
respective subparts based on the type of harm experienced by a child
under the age of eighteen.84  Under the FCA, a parent neglects a child
when the parent fails to exercise a minimum degree of care in supply-
ing the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or education under
the law, or with medical, dental, optometric, or surgical care despite
being financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable
means to do so, resulting in the physical, mental, or emotional impair-
ment of the child.85  A parent may also be adjudicated as neglectful if
they fail to exercise a minimum degree of care in providing the child
with proper supervision or guardianship or by inflicting or allowing to
be inflicted harm or a substantial risk thereof.86  For removal, the party
bringing the neglect allegations must prove that removal is necessary to
avoid imminent risk to the child’s life or health.87
Scholars suggest that such legislation stems from state concerns
about the negative impacts of a child’s exposure to domestic violence.88
The legislative history of the New York law mandating court considera-
tion of proven domestic violence is especially demonstrative; the history
cites studies indicating that children exposed to domestic violence are
at risk of developing anxiety, depression, low self-esteem, developmen-
tal difficulties, and socialization difficulties.  The legislative history
emphasizes that children who live in a climate of domestic violence
learn to use physical violence as an outlet for anger and are more likely
79. RESOURCE CTR. ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: CHILD PROT. AND CUSTODY, A PROJECT OF
THE FAMILY VIOLENCE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROGRAM OF THE NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVE-
NILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AS A FACTOR TO BE CONSIDERED IN
CUSTODY/VISITATION DETERMINATIONS (2013).
80. RESOURCE CTR. ON FAMILY VIOLENCE: CHILD PROT. AND CUSTODY, A PROJECT OF
THE FAMILY VIOLENCE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS PROGRAM OF THE NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVE-
NILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CHILDREN’S EXPOSURE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTI-
TUTES CHILD ABUSE AND/OR NEGLECT (2014).
81. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 4, at 850 (citing 1996 N.Y.
Laws ch. 85 § 1; N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 240(1) (McKinney 1996)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 851–52 (citing N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012 (McKinney 1998)).
84. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(f) (McKinney 1998).
85. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(f)(i)(A) (McKinney 1998).
86. N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 1012(f)(i)(B) (McKinney 1998).
87. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 4, at 851.
88. Id. at 850–51 (citing 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, at 121).
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to use violence to solve problems throughout their lives.89  However, it
is possible that domestic violence advocates could never have foreseen
that the FCA would lead to “failure to protect” decisions in which bat-
tered mothers, not their abusers, are adjudicated as having neglected
their children.90
Procedure on the investigation and removal of children based on
allegations of neglect through possible exposure to domestic violence
varies state by state, but New York’s system may offer an example.  In
New York, the state’s child welfare division has a responsibility to inves-
tigate reports of neglect or abuse to determine whether the report is
“indicated”; if so, this body must determine whether the children are in
imminent risk of harm and thus should be removed from the home.91
In the domestic violence context, child welfare workers have no guiding
standards as to when to remove a child from a home based on a
mother’s perceived inaction and are not trained in how to assess
domestic violence cases; as a result, scholarship suggests that responses
to domestic violence cases are inconsistent and vary from worker to
worker.  New York law requires the welfare division to offer services to
the mother before removing children from the home, such as a safety
plan for the mother and children, arrangements to stay at a shelter, or
an order of protection.  However, some scholars suggest that children
are too often removed before any effort is made to provide such ser-
vices; sometimes, such services may also not be safe or available options,
depending on the facts of a given case.92
Some scholars point to a case called In Re Lonell J. as the seminal
case shaping the development of child welfare cases in which domestic
violence is implicated as the means of neglect.93  In that case, a New
York appellate court considered whether an infant and toddler were
neglected based on a pattern of domestic violence between parents in
the presence of the children.94  There, evidence on the record demon-
strated that the father beat the mother in front of the children, that the
mother complained to a caseworker that the father was raping her, that
the police had been called on several occasions, and that an order of
protection was issued at one point.95  The court in Lonell ruled that the
catch-all provision of § 1012 of the Family Court Act “clearly contem-
plates that the instances of neglectful behavior mentioned therein are
not an exclusive list.”96  That court rejected prior decisions holding that
removal of a child who had witnessed domestic violence could only
occur when the child was placed in imminent risk of physical impair-
ment and also rejected decisions relying on expert testimony to demon-
89. Id. (citing 1996 N.Y. Laws ch. 85, at 121).
90. Id. at 851.
91. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 4, at 855.
92. Id. at 855–56.
93. Id. at 852.
94. See In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
95. Id. at 116–117.
96. Id. at 117.
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strate the harm done to the children.97  Ultimately, the Lonell court
concluded that the mother in question was not “willing to take the child
away from the abusive father,” although the court did not elaborate as
to what “taking the child away” meant.  Finally, the court reasoned that
to fail to hold that abuse in the presence of children constitutes neglect
would be synonymous with holding that domestic violence is necessarily
less serious than substance abuse.  The court thus found that domestic
violence between parents in the presence of their children may be suffi-
cient to establish neglect under the Family Court Act, even absent
expert testimony, and remanded the case for proceedings to determine
an appropriate remedy that would further the child’s best interests.98
A later case, Nicholson v. Scoppetta, appears to undercut Lonell’s rul-
ing.  In Nicholson, a class of mothers and children brought suit under
§ 1983, challenging the constitutionality of their city’s policy of remov-
ing children from mothers’ custody solely on the ground that the
mothers had failed to prevent the children from witnessing domestic
violence against the mothers.99  In that case, the court held that evi-
dence that a caretaker allowed a child to witness domestic abuse against
the caretaker is insufficient, without more, to satisfy the statutory defini-
tion of a neglected child, and that emotional injury arising from wit-
nessing domestic violence can rise to a level that justifies the removal of
a child, but that the witnessing itself does not give rise to any presump-
tion of injury.100  The court in that case also specifically stated that the
court did not read Lonell “as supportive of a presumption that if a child
has witnessed domestic violence, the child has been harmed and
removal is appropriate.  That presumption would be impermissible.”101
While Nicholson seems to suggest that the filing of § 1983 suits may
be a possible solution to the problem of failure to protect custody deci-
sions, it fails to adequately address many existing neglect regimes.  For
instance, Connecticut’s abuse and neglect statute states,
The State of Connecticut finds that family violence can result in
abuse and neglect of the children living in the household where
such violence occurs and the prevention of child abuse and neg-
lect depends on coordination of domestic violence and children
protective services.  The Commissioner of Children and Families
may consider the existence and impact of family violence in any
child abuse investigation and may assist family members in
obtaining protection from family violence.102
Notably, the Connecticut statute contains no requirement that the
child witness or be exposed to the violence at all.  While other states,
such as Delaware, include requirements in their statutes that the child
must witness the violence or be exposed to it through sight or sound,
97. Id. at 117–118.
98. Id. at 116–119.
99. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840 (N.Y. 2004).
100. Id. at 840.
101. Id. at 855.
102. CHILDREN’S EXPOSURE TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONSTITUTES CHILD ABUSE AND/
OR NEGLECT, supra note 80.
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other states, like Connecticut, Montana, and Washington, carry no such
requirement.  Washington broadly defines “negligent treatment” as “an
act or a failure to act, or the cumulative effects of a pattern of conduct,
behavior, or inaction, that evidences a serious disregard of conse-
quences.”103  Montana’s statute is equally broad, stating that a “child in
need of protection or services . . . is one whose behavior, condition, or
environment is such as to be injurious or dangerous to the child or
others.  An injurious or dangerous environment may include, but is not
limited to, the exposure of a child to criminal activity in the child’s
home.”104  Therefore, several states define neglect so broadly that even
a child who has not been physically exposed to domestic violence may
be considered to be neglected by a non-abusive parent, and as a result,
Nicholson appears to inadequately solve the problem full-stop.
There are several reasons why “failure to protect” custody decisions
adversely affect both the victim and the children.  First, the removal of
children from their homes is extremely detrimental to their well-being;
second, such decisions serve to disincentivize parents who are victims of
domestic violence from seeking the help they need; third, such deci-
sions directly contradict the principle laid out in Stanley; fourth, and
most importantly, the Supreme Court’s holding in Castle Rock taken in
combination with such “failure to protect” custody decisions creates a
system in which victims may be punished for failure to protect their
children while law enforcement are almost never held accountable for
their failure to protect victims.  This creates an impossible situation for
victims of domestic violence who wish to maintain custody of their chil-
dren and simultaneously protect themselves and their children from
harm.
While removing children from a home where domestic violence
has occurred does appear to be a viable short-term approach to protect-
ing children from harm, evidence suggests that removal often has
severe consequences for the children and the family unit.105  Scholar-
ship points to studies showing that upon removal, reunification is
unlikely, and the entry into foster care can pose substantial risks to the
child.106  For instance, children in foster care are placed at a 75%
higher risk of mistreatment, become twice as likely to die, and are four
times as likely to be sexually abused; other risks include health
problems, inadequate medical care, behavioral problems, and emo-
tional problems.  In addition, removal from the home may be particu-
larly emotionally harmful for children who have been exposed to
domestic violence.  Compared to other children, they tend to perceive
their world as “unpredictable and unsafe”; thus, removing them from
the home they know may be more traumatic for them.107  Therefore,
while children who are exposed to domestic violence do face real risks
by remaining in the family home where the violence has occurred, they
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Lindauer, supra note 4, at 811.
106. Id. at 811.
107. Id. at 811–12.
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are exposed to perhaps even more serious harms and increased emo-
tional trauma if they are removed from the custody of a non-abusive
parent.
One of several ominous consequences of our civil system’s punish-
ment of battered mothers through “failure to protect” custody decisions
is that such decisions discourage battered mothers from seeking the
services they need to escape domestic violence.108  Evidence suggests
that when social service organizations identify domestic violence as an
indicator of child abuse, child abuse reports increase and the number
of battered women seeking services decreases.109  Such a system has the
potential to put battered mothers in fear of mandated reporters such as
social workers, teachers, doctors, or the police—all actors who, in a per-
fect world, have the potential to help domestic violence victims seeking
protection.110  As a result, “failure to protect” regimes not only fail to
solve the initial problem of the abuse by failing to remove the abuser
himself from the home or from the victim’s life, but also have a chilling
effect on victims’ willingness to seek assistance from very important
state actors for fear of implicating themselves in a possible child welfare
proceeding.
“Failure to protect” custody decisions also directly contradict the
premise laid out in Stanley, which mandates individualized findings of
parental unfitness before a child can be removed from the custody of
any parent.  Such decisions are inconsistent with Stanley’s assertion that
the state must prove that a parent neglected or abused their child in
order for custody to be removed, because charging battered mothers
with “failure to protect” implies that by preventing violence against
themselves, they have, by proxy, neglected their children.111  The Stan-
ley decision stands for the proposition that parents have a constitutional
right to an individualized determination of parental fitness before
parental rights may be terminated.  While many custody removals do
not ultimately result in the termination of parental rights, the impor-
tance of the right to parent one’s children as vindicated by Stanley dem-
onstrates that removal decisions based on “failure to protect,” a
doctrine that punishes an innocent parent for the abuse of another,
flies in the face of Supreme Court precedent.
Finally, “failure to protect” custody decisions place victim mothers
in an impossible situation given our criminal and civil system’s inade-
quate abilities to protect victim mothers in turn.  If an abuser attacks a
victim who has children, say in violation of a restraining order, she is
faced with a set of choices.  She can call the police, who may do one of
two things.  Given the Castle Rock decision, which vindicated police dis-
cretion in responding to restraining orders even in the face of seem-
108. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 4, at 849.
109. Id. at 857.
110. Id. (“The policy of removing children from battered mothers can be inter-
preted to mean that any time a battered mother goes to a social worker, talks to her
children’s teacher, goes to her doctor or calls the police to report domestic violence, she
may be placing the custody of her children in jeopardy.”).
111. Id. at 849.
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ingly mandatory statutory language, the police may not do anything at
all.  The Supreme Court has squarely decided that at least constitution-
ally speaking, they will not be held accountable for their inaction.  Or,
the police may respond to the scene.  In that case, the victim may be
placed in a position where state actors entering her home take note of
the fact that her children were present while the abuse took place,
potentially exposing her to involvement with a local child protection
agency that may seek to have custody removed.  Not wanting to subject
herself and her family to custody court involvement, the victim may
decide not to report her abuse, running the risk of injuring herself in
the process.  This impossible choice reflects a vast misunderstanding on
the parts of the courts and legislatures as to why victims of domestic
violence stay with their attackers.
Put most simply, for domestic violence victims, the decision to
leave their attacker can be dangerous in and of itself.112  First, as dis-
cussed supra, one of the most dangerous times for a woman in an abu-
sive relationship is the time in which she and her children leave the
batterer, because the batterer becomes more likely to stalk, harass, or
even kill.  In addition, women who choose to leave their abusers may
find themselves dislocated or even homeless and with potentially
impacted financial resources.  For instance, in one 12-month period in
the late 1990s, New York City’s Victim Services Agency received 34,175
requests for domestic violence shelter, as well as an average 38.2
unduplicated requests for shelter every single day, while the average
availability of the shelter was roughly 11 spaces.113  In addition,
research demonstrates that the majority of parents involved in child
welfare cases are indigent; this, coupled with the fact that approxi-
mately one-third of battered women lose their jobs as a direct result of
abuse, demonstrates that the abuse of women is a serious form of eco-
nomic control over women.114
Instead of taking into account the physical, emotional, and finan-
cial challenges faced by domestic violence victims considering cutting
ties with an abuser, our system punishes victims for their failure to find
their way out of toxic relationships by removing child custody.  Often,
child welfare agencies ignore the fact that a woman has taken one of
the most (theoretically) effective steps towards ending the abuse and
her contact with the abuser when she obtains a restraining order.  In
Lonell, the Court noted that at one point during the cyclical abuse that
the mother in that case endured, the mother obtained an order of pro-
tection; however, in the same breath, the Court implied that the
mother in this case was not “willing” to “take the child away from the
abusive father.”115  This sends the message that even if a mother does
decide to obtain a restraining order, and even if the police do enforce
it, that this may not be enough to prevent the removal of her children
112. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 4, at 858.
113. Id. at 859.
114. Lindauer, supra note 4, at 815–16.
115. In re Lonell J., 673 N.Y.S.2d at 117–18.
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based on a perceived “failure to protect.”  Therefore, our child welfare
system’s imposition of negligence-based “failure to protect” legislation
and common law makes our civil system’s already inadequate
restraining order regime even more unworkable.
III. PROPOSED REMEDIES TO THE CATCH-22 EXPERIENCED
BY BATTERED MOTHERS
Because our current regime’s approach to the intersection of
domestic violence and child welfare is murky, scholarship is not well
settled as to what constitutes the most effective remedy.  However, in
order to combat the “Catch-22” imposed by failure to protect jurispru-
dence and Castle Rock’s limiting of available remedies to domestic vio-
lence victims harmed by police inaction, three possible improvements
to our civil system may be effective: increasing the strength of
mandatory enforcement restraining orders, re-defining our system’s
conception of neglect, and the effective training of police in the dynam-
ics of domestic violence relationships.
First, increasing both the implementation and forcefulness of
mandatory arrest statutes for restraining orders may be very effective at
separating victims from their attackers, thus increasing the victim’s
safety and decreasing her likelihood of becoming involved in state-initi-
ated custody proceedings.  Some scholars argue that mandatory arrest
laws are the best approach because they deter offenders and increase
domestic violence arrests by eliminating police discretion without nec-
essarily changing police perception towards arrest.116  Other scholars
emphasize the importance of mandatory arrest statutes in terms of their
ability to overcome the cycle of violence; these scholars point to the
increased likelihood of violence in the immediate aftermath after a vic-
tim takes action as one of the reasons why mandatory arrest statutes are
so important.  When a victim takes legal action, her attacker may retali-
ate based on a perception that his relationship, and thus, his control
over the victim are coming to an end.  Therefore, mandatory arrest stat-
utes are thought to greatly protect a victim’s safety in the vulnerable
time period after a victim chooses to take action.  In fact, a majority of
states employ mandatory arrest statutes.117  However, in Castle Rock, the
Supreme Court undermined the original intent of state mandatory
arrest legislation by holding that the restraining order statute at issue
did not mandate arrest, despite the fact that lower courts had inter-
preted otherwise.118  Some commentators argue that in effect, the Cas-
tle Rock decision prohibits state legislatures from creating mandatory
enforcement provisions because the Court held that even though the
plain language of the Colorado statute mandated enforcement, the stat-
ute created no entitlement to enforcement.119  This, however, does not
116. Metusalem, supra note 30, at 1055.
117. Cambria, supra note 53, at 162–65.
118. Metusalem, supra note 30, at 1055; Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S.
748, 755 (2005).
119. Smiertka, supra note 34, at 115–16.
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make mandatory arrest statutes completely unworkable; in light of Cas-
tle Rock’s holding, mandatory arrest statutes may be made more power-
ful by including stronger language to give law enforcement a more
“clear direction” and by including increased penalties for violation of a
restraining order.120  In Castle Rock, the majority opined that the lan-
guage in the Colorado statute stating that officers “shall arrest” an indi-
vidual violating a restraining order was not strong enough to trigger a
mandatory arrest.121  Therefore, advocates of mandatory arrest laws
suggest that states adopt language similar to Alaska’s statute, which is
entitled “[m]andatory arrest for crimes involving domestic violence, vio-
lation of [restraining] orders, and violation of conditions of release,” or
Nevada’s, which states, “[e]very temporary or extended order must
include a provision ordering any law enforcement officer to arrest an
adverse party if the officer has probable cause to believe that the
adverse party has violated any provision of the order”; these statutes
clearly remove the officer’s discretion in deciding whether or not to
make an arrest for violation of an order, thereby making arrest
mandatory.122
Critics of mandatory arrest laws object to their implementation on
a number of grounds—a chief concern being that such laws interfere
with the autonomy of victims.123  Such critics argue that such laws fail to
consider victim preferences with regard to arrest in situations in which
many women do not actually want their husbands or partners to be
arrested, even if they do seek police intervention.124  Critics of
mandatory arrest also argue that mandatory arrest laws result in an
increase in the number of women arrested and pose special problems
for mothers.125  States with mandatory arrest laws experience a rate of
female arrests as high as 30% due to police inability to identify the ini-
tial or primary aggressor.  Importantly, mandatory arrest policies may
create particular difficulties for women with children living in the
home; in those situations, compulsory state involvement may implicate
the policies of child protection organizations who have expanded their
definitions of child abuse to include situations in which children reside
in a home in which an incident of domestic violence has occurred.126
In this way, mandatory arrest may be an imperfect solution for victim
mothers living in states with strong failure to protect regimes.
Proponents of mandatory arrest would counter that mandatory
arrest statutes have the opposite effect, in that they actually empower
women by providing a mechanism that circumvents abuse cycles in
which women are isolated and manipulated so severely that they are
unable to take affirmative steps in having their abusers arrested.  Advo-
cates of mandatory arrest argue that such regimes can renew a victim’s
120. Metusalem, supra note 30, at 1055.
121. Id. at 1058; See also Town of Castle Rock, 545 U.S. at 760.
122. See Metusalem, supra note 30, at 1059–60 (emphasis omitted).
123. Id. at 1056–57.
124. Zelcer, supra note 10, at 548.
125. Id. at 550–51.
126. Id. at 551.
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self-esteem by helping her to realize that her community cares about
her safety in light of the social message such regimes send that domestic
violence is a crime that will not be tolerated.127  Strong arguments sur-
vive both in favor of and against mandatory arrest statutes.  On one
hand, strengthening mandatory arrest laws takes away the discretion
that the Castle Rock decision read into the Colorado restraining order
statute in order to justify the inaction of the Castle Rock police depart-
ment.  On the other hand, mandatory arrest laws may be too cumber-
some and too broad to effectively deal with the diverse nature of
domestic violence cases, and may invite state involvement in situations
in which such involvement may result in severe collateral damage, such
as the loss of custody of the victim’s children.
Some critics of mandatory arrest restraining order statutes advo-
cate instead for “preferential arrest” regimes.128  Preferential arrest laws
contain language indicating that the state expects an arrest to occur in
certain circumstances by restricting police discretion but allowing the
police to retain some discretion.  Preferential arrest statutes are
designed to take into account the fact that domestic violence incidents
vary from situation to situation, and that victim responses in turn vary
based on different arrest policies.129  One example of such a law is Cali-
fornia’s statute, which states,
(a) Every law enforcement agency in this state shall develop,
adopt, and implement written policies and standards for officers’
responses to domestic violence calls by January 1, 1986.  These
policies shall reflect that domestic violence is an alleged criminal
conduct.  Further, they shall reflect existing policy that a request
for assistance in a situation involving domestic violence is the
same as any other request for assistance where violence has
occurred.
(b) The written policies shall encourage the arrest of domes-
tic violence offenders if there is probable cause that an offense has
been committed.130
However, this Author would submit that such statutes do not with-
stand the weight of the Castle Rock opinion. Castle Rock held that a stat-
ute containing much stronger language did not mandate arrest and
thus did not create an entitlement to enforcement; on those grounds,
the majority effectively destroyed available civil remedies for domestic
violence victims harmed by an abuse of any perceived police discretion.
In this Author’s opinion, increasing the strength of mandatory arrest
statutes may be very effective at protecting domestic violence victims
and their children; however, such an implementation may increase
state involvement in victims’ lives, creating increased exposure to man-
dated reporters.  This, in turn, may be an unworkable solution in
127. Cambria, supra note 53, at 165.
128. Zelcer, supra note 10, at 554.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 554–55 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 13701 (West 2012)).
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regimes in which negligence broadly encompasses the failure to protect
one’s children from domestic violence.
Second, some scholarship suggests that a complete overhaul of our
civil system’s conception of neglect is needed in order to simultane-
ously protect victim parents and maintain the family unit.  Some schol-
ars point to a guide called the Greenbrook Initiative as a potential
means of helping end the trend of “failure to protect” jurisprudence.
The Greenbrook Initiative aimed to assist child welfare agencies,
domestic violence service providers, and juvenile courts in collaborating
to effectively respond to families dealing with domestic violence.131  As
part of the Initiative, the Department of Justice together with the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services granted financial and other
support to six communities with differing needs and demographics in
order to implement a series of recommendations over a five year
period.  The Initiative explored three areas of systemic change: “philo-
sophical approach to co-occurrence, screening and assessment, and
case planning and service array for adult victims of domestic violence
and domestic violence perpetrators.”132
Though the Initiative was first experimented with over a decade
ago, the goals and objectives of the initiative may serve as a helpful
model in structuring future reforms.  Specifically, the Initiative recog-
nized some of the most important legal challenges created by the inter-
section of domestic violence and child welfare.  First, the Initiative
recognized that a battered mother’s decision to remain with her abuser
is a more nuanced question than whether or not she is comfortable
with placing her children in potential danger.  For instance, the Initia-
tive’s Recommendations state,
Many people frequently ask, “Why do battered women stay when
this places them and their children in jeopardy?”  This question
misses the way battered women calculate their risks and make
decisions about their lives.  The questions a battered woman may
ask herself are more complete, such as: “If I leave, will the violence
be worse?”  “Should I leave and place myself and my children in
poverty?”133
As a result of an understanding of the impossible situations in
which battered mothers find themselves, the Recommendations empha-
size that broad, blanket rules of general applicability cannot adequately
address the diverse array of domestic violence cases, recognizing that
the abuse will always vary in degree and severity.  The Recommenda-
tions point out that in some jurisdictions, domestic violence is automati-
cally considered to pose a serious risk to the child and thus warrants the
131. Lindauer, supra note 4, at 813.
132. Id. at 813–14 (citing Duren Banks et. al., Changing Policy and Practice in the Child
Welfare System Through Collaborative Efforts to Respond Effectively to Family Violence, 23 J. INTER-
PERSONAL VIOLENCE 903, 906 (2008)).
133. SUSAN SCHECTER AND JEFFREY L. EDLESON, ET AL., EFFECTIVE INTERVENTION IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE & CHILD MALTREATMENT CASES: GUIDELINES FOR POLICY AND PRACTICE,
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF JUVENILE AND FAMILY COURT JUDGES
FAMILY VIOLENCE DEPARTMENT 11 (1999).
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opening of a protection case, while in other jurisdictions, domestic vio-
lence is rarely considered to present a child protection risk at all; the
Recommendations condemn both of these responses as inadequate.
Instead, the Recommendations encourage jurisdictions to avoid the cre-
ation of a child protection system that simply removes more and more
children for their own safety by working towards three core values: cre-
ating safety, enhancing well-being for children and adults, and building
permanency and stability for children.  This emphasis on “permanency
and stability” reflects a recognition by the Greenbrook Initiative that
children function best if they remain safely with their families.134  As a
way to ensure stability and permanency, the Recommendations
encourage child welfare administrators and juvenile court personnel to
try to keep children affected by maltreatment and domestic violence in
the care of their non-offending parent whenever possible; they also
encourage communities to design service systems that entitle any adult
or child victim to receive help with or without opening a child protection
case.135  In order to balance the important, but at times, juxtaposed
goals of safety and stability, the Recommendations suggest two types of
interventions that help battered adults and remove risks to children
exposed to violence: 1) remove risk caused by the perpetrator of vio-
lence through means tailored to the specific facts of each case, includ-
ing but not limited to arrest, batterer intervention programs, protective
orders, monitoring of compliance with court orders, substance abuse
treatment, and fatherhood classes; and 2) further safety and stability for
victims and children through tailored means, including but not limited
to housing and financial support services, transportation, childcare, job
training, child support, custody and visitation orders, and help from
domestic violence advocates.136  Scholarship suggests that the findings
of the Greenbrook Initiative were varied, based on its report.137
Although tangible results of the Initiative seem hard to pin down or
identify, successful collaboration was identified as one of the Initiative’s
successes.  Though data collection for the initiative ended in 2006, sev-
eral sites continued the Initiative on their own using rollover funds
from the grants.138  Therefore, while the measurable successes of the
Greenbrook Initiative may have yet to be seen, this Author would sub-
mit that the goals and objectives of the Initiative may serve as a very
helpful model for future reforms.
A more legally concrete approach towards effectively addressing
the intersection of domestic violence and child welfare would be
through legislation geared at protecting battered mothers from pre-
sumptions of neglect.  For example, one legislative approach is a “bat-
tered woman defense” such as the one proposed in 1994 by a New York
State assemblyman that amended the definition of neglect to provide a
defense that the parent had “a reasonable expectation, apprehension
134. Id. at 19–22.
135. Id. at 14–15.
136. Id. at 20.
137. Lindauer, supra note 4, at 814.
138. Id.
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or fear that acting to stop or prevent such abuse would result in sub-
stantial bodily harm to parent or other person legally responsible for
the care of the or to the child.”139  The amendment also would have
permitted the parent to put on expert testimony showing their inability
to protect the child was due to a reasonable expectation, apprehension,
or fear that preventing or stopping the alleged abuse or neglect would
result in physical injury to the subject child or respondent.140  Other
proposed legislative solutions emphasize the provision of services to
domestic violence victims.141  Either way, because existing laws such as
the Family Care Act are vague enough to permit courts to engage in
“failure to protect” jurisprudence, an effective way of combating the
broad and permissive language allowing courts to view victimhood as a
form of negligence may be through enacting specific legislation.
Finally, some scholars suggest that training police to better under-
stand the dynamic inherent to abusive relationships may help protect
victims and their children.  For instance, the Civil Protection Orders
Improvement Guide’s strategies for responding officers spells out sev-
eral ways for such officers to prioritize effective enforcement.142  The
Guide encourages officers to arrest violators of protection orders when
the respondent has constructive knowledge of the order, unless state
law requires verification of service and enforce the protection order if it
is valid on its face.143  These measures alone do not appear to ask much
more of the responding officer than to comply with state law with
respect to restraining orders; however, the Guide does encourage sev-
eral other strategies that go above and beyond the statutory guidance
included on most protection orders.  For instance, the Guide encour-
ages officers to take measures to combat jurisdictional issues often asso-
ciated with the enforcement of protection orders when custody is at
issue; the Guide encourages officers to enforce custody provisions in
out-of-state and tribal orders even if the officer’s state statutes do not
provide for awards of temporary child custody within protection orders
by referring victims to appropriate court or advocacy agencies, consid-
ering arresting the respondent for parental kidnapping or interference
with custody (if applicable), and working directly with other applicable
jurisdictions when enforcing custody provisions in protection orders.
In addition, it suggests that officers examine the context and history of
the abuse in parental kidnapping cases, to refrain from leaving the
scene without referring the victim to available resources, to document
violations of protection orders even when they may not constitute an
arrest-able offense, to build a stalking or sexual assault case when
appropriate, to recognize that individual violations may be part of a
larger pattern, and to explore with the victim ways that law enforcement
can help increase her safety.  In addition, this Guide, written by law
139. The “Failure to Protect” Working Group, supra note 4, at 866 (citing A. 11870,
208th Sess. N.Y. (1994) (amended 1999)).
140. Id. at 866.
141. Id. at 866–87.
142. MEYER, supra note 22, at 14.
143. Id.
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enforcement officers, also lays out strategies not just for responding
officers but for department leaders in order to strengthen effective
enforcement of orders; those strategies include developing protocols
that clearly direct officers to arrest respondents for probable cause vio-
lations of protection orders as required or permitted under state law,
developing protocols for prompt service of related arrest warrants, and
facilitating officer access to databases and registries so that they can
obtain the full text of protection orders and the status of service 24
hours a day.144
However, scholars point to studies indicating that 98% of police
academies offer domestic violence training to officers for an average of
only 12 hours, paling in comparison to other components of police
training; in addition, only about half of police departments in the coun-
try require specialized training for call dispatchers.145  But, despite
these obvious imperfections, proponents of officer training as a solu-
tion suggest that this approach has the potential to be effective if
officers are trained in some of the more complicated aspects of domes-
tic violence calls, such as uncooperative parties, mutual combatants,
alcohol or drug involved violence, and violations of protective orders.
In addition, partnerships between police departments and victim advo-
cacy groups may prove to be a valuable means of confronting chal-
lenges such as institutionalized racism and sexism, inadequate federal
and state funding, and problems within police culture; as of 2013,
approximately 65% of police departments had partnered with victim
advocacy groups.146  However, while adequate officer training certainly
has the potential to improve on-the-ground officer responses to domes-
tic violence calls, the current prevalence of domestic violence in the
United States will require a much more comprehensive effort.
CONCLUSION
Clearly, domestic violence is an epidemic problem in the United
States.  While our criminal justice system has made a broad effort to
address the problem through criminalizing what historically was consid-
ered as a matter of private concern, the prevalence of domestic violence
demonstrates that the system’s response has been imperfect.  In addi-
tion, law enforcement attitudes towards domestic violence reflect a per-
ception that domestic violence cases are low-priority.  Specifically, cases
such as Castle Rock demonstrate two sobering truths: 1) police failure to
enforce restraining orders is a very real problem with devastating conse-
quences; 2) with no civil remedy in federal court for non-enforcement,
victims of police inaction stand little to no chance of having their rights
to the enforcement of orders designed to protect them vindicated.
Our civil system’s failure to vindicate the rights of domestic vio-
lence victims is problematic in and of itself.  This is circular: domestic
violence victims enjoy little to no civil remedy when law enforcement
144. Id. at 14–16.
145. Zelcer, supra note 10, at 556.
146. Id. at 556–57.
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officers literally fail to protect them through failure to uphold and
enforce protection orders, allowing batterers to continue their abuse,
yet the same victims may be punished by our child welfare system for
failing to protect their children when they remain in abusive relation-
ships.  This cyclical system sends a message to battered mothers that
society does not care about protecting them, but will take every reasona-
ble step to prevent their children from being exposed to the abuse that
society allows to continue.
If we are to protect victims of domestic violence from further abuse
and work towards keeping the family unit intact, our system must
change.
